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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KEVIN CALVEY, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
-vs- ) Case No. CIV-10-353-R
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
[Doc. No 12]; Plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint [Doc. No. 19] and Plaintiffs’ proposed
Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 19-1]; Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ motion
to dismiss [Doc. No. 16]; and Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss [Doc.
No. 21].
In their reply brief, Defendants state that they have no objection to Plaintiffs’
proposed amendment of their Amended Complaint.  See Reply [Doc. No. 21] at p. 1. 
Moreover, Defendants address the allegation and claims in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Second
Amended Complaint in their reply brief.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ amended motion to amend
is GRANTED and the proposed Second Amended Complaint attached thereto [Doc. No. 17-
1] shall be deemed filed instanter, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss as augmented by
Defendants’ reply shall be treated as directed to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
In support of their motion to dismiss, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1), F.R.Civ.P., Defendants assert that Plaintiffs lack standing as to all of their
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claims and that their claims are not ripe.  Encompassed within Defendants’ arguments, they
assert that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish standing and that their
claims are ripe.
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 124 Stat. 119 (March 23, 2010), as amended by
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (Mar. 30, 2010), hereinafter referred to as the “ACA” or simply the “Act,” and
apparently in particular the minimum coverage provision of the Act, Section 1501 of th
ACA, is unconstitutional because 1) Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause
to force private citizens, including Plaintiffs, to purchase health care coverage and the Act
therefore violates the Commerce Clause (First Claim); Congress lacks authority under Article
I, § 2, 8 & 9 of the Constitution, and by implication the Sixteenth Amendment, to impose a
capitation tax to enforce a mandate that private citizens, including Plaintiffs, purchase health
care coverage under the Act (Second Claim); the power to enact legislation such as the Act
is specifically reserved to the states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment (Third Claim); by
forcing Plaintiffs to contribute to the funding of abortion, the Act violates Plaintiffs’
“fundamental rights of conscience and the free exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment” (Fourth Claim); the Act deprives Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws,
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y providing for some religious
exemptions from the mandates of the Act, but forcing Plaintiffs to contribute to the funding
of abortion in violation of their . . . religious convictions” and “[b]y funding and benefitting
2
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certain special interest organizations, including unions, through tax exemptions and other
mechanisms,” based on their political viewpoints, and “[b]y providing for ‘earmarks,’ or
special interest expenditures,” while denying similar funding and benefits to other individuals
who don’t share similar viewpoints or favor with Congress or Defendants (Fifth Claim); the
Act violates the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment by mandating that all
private citizens, including Plaintiffs, purchase health care coverage under penalty of law
(Sixth Claim); and it requires citizens to provide private medical information to the federal
government and/or its designated agents or authorized health care providers in violation of
the Fourth Amendment (Seventh Claim).  Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Act
violates the Constitution as set forth in Plaintiffs’ claims and a preliminary and permanent
injunction enjoining the Act’s enforcement.
For a federal court to have jurisdiction over an action, the party bringing suit must
establish standing.  The Wildnerness Society v. Kane County, Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1168
(10th Cir. 2011)(citing cases).  The “irreducible constitutional minimum” requirements for
standing are three.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130,    , 119
L.Ed.2d 351, 364 (1992); Opala v. Watt, 454 F.3d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006).  First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact which is an invasion of a legally protected
interest, which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural
or hypothetical.  Id.  Secondly, there mut be a causal connection between the plaintiff’s
injury and the conduct of which the plaintiff complains such that the injury is “fairly
traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of an independent
3
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action of some third party not before the Court.  Id.  Thirdly, it must be “likely” rather than
merely “speculative” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 
Id.  The Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing all three elements of standing.  Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at     , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364; Opala, 454 F.3d at 1157.  Moreover,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim they assert and for each form of relief
they seek.  Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171
L.Ed.2d 737, 748 (2008); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007)(“Each
plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief in each claim.”).
Three of the Plaintiffs herein allege that they “currently do not have health insurance
and have no desire or plans to purchase health insurance;” and that the Act requires them
“now to investigate how the Act will impact them, investigate alternatives to their current
provision for health care, and alter their finances and save money in preparation for the
imminent requirement in the Act that . . . [they] purchase health insurance.”  Second
Amended Complaint at ¶ 9.  All Plaintiffs “even those currently with health insurance” allege
that they must now investigate how the Act will impact them, investigate alternatives to their
current provision for health care, and alter their finances and save money in preparation for
the imminent requirement in the Act that such Plaintiffs purchase health insurance.”  Id. at
¶ 10.  In summary, all Plaintiffs allege that they must currently take investigatory steps and
make financial arrangements now to ensure compliance with the Act.
Defendants argue that the three Plaintiffs who do not currently have health insurance
and object to being required to purchase it have not alleged sufficient facts to establish
4
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standing with regard to their First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims.  This is so, they assert,
because those Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that they are very likely to be
subject to the minimum coverage provision in 2014 and because they have not alleged that
they are foregoing purchases now to save money to buy insurance in the future, as was true
in the cases on which Plaintiffs rely to assert that they have standing.  With respect to the
Plaintiffs who currently have health insurance, Defendants argue that they have not
established an injury in fact with respect to their First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims for
Relief.  Defendants assert that those Plaintiffs’ contention in the brief in opposition to
Defendants’ motion that their need to take investigatory steps and make financial
arrangements now for other means of health insurance or payment of health costs due to the
“fact” that the cost of Plaintiffs’ health insurance will increase does not demonstrate injury
in fact because the predicate “fact” is merely a unilateral prediction and speculation about
possible future events, citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717,    
   , 109 L.Ed.2d 135, 147 (1996); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 233-35, 110
S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603,      (1990); Covenant Media of S.C., L.L.C. v. City of North
Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 429-30 (4th Cir. 2007).  Defendants further argue that these
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury, even assuming that it will occur in the future, is not fairly traceable
to the ACA because the Act doesn’t require insurance companies to raise their rates and there
is no guarantee or even a likelihood that any insurance companies that do raise rates in the
future will lower them if Plaintiffs prevail.  Defendants argue that in any event, Plaintiffs’
claims of injury depend on the choices of third parties not before the court whose actions the
5
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Court cannot presume either to control or predict, citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560,  112 S.Ct.
at      , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 42-43 & 45-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450, 462-63 & 464-65 (1976).
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have also failed to allege a sufficient injury to confer
standing to make their fifth claim, that for an equal protection violation, because Plaintiffs
have failed to cite an ACA provision that could be considered an “earmark,” “special interest
expenditure” or a tax exemption favoring unions and for that matter do not allege any facts
showing that Plaintiffs don’t benefit from the alleged “earmarks,” expenditures or exemption
or point to other individuals who do benefit from those alleged “provisions” so as to
demonstrate injury resulting from differential treatment.  Defendants conclude that
“Plaintiffs’ vague and conclusory allegation that unidentified provisions of the Act treat them
differently, in unspecified ways, than other unidentified individuals or organizations is
simply not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden to establish standing.”  Defendants’ Reply
at p. 8, citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.       , 129 S.Ct. 1937,       , 173 L.Ed.2d 868, (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); and
Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 888 (10th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish standing for their seventh
claim, for a Fourth Amendment violation, Defendants assert, because Plaintiffs do not point
to any provision of the ACA that requires taxpayers to report whether they have health
insurance and if so, what kind.  Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ allegation that Plaintiffs
6
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will be required “to provide private medical information to the federal government and/or its
designated agents or authorized health care providers.”  Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 60.
Finally, in a footnote, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for relief
predicated on the Free Exercise Clause, should be dismissed for lack of standing, because
Defendants have shown in their opening brief that the ACA does not require the purchase of
insurance that covers abortion services and Plaintiffs in their response did not dispute this. 
Reply Brief at p. 9 n. 7.
As noted above, Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.  They argue
that Plaintiffs allege no injury, and that any injury that might be implied from the Amended
Complaint could not occur before 2014, if even then. Not only is Plaintiffs’ injury not
inevitable, Defendants assert, but Plaintiffs have not shown that the ACA has any direct day-
to-day effect on them.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (filed prior to Plaintiffs’ motion to
amend their Amended Complaint) at p. 14.
I.  Standing for Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims for Relief
A. The Three Uninsured Plaintiffs
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ arguments and authorities and other
authorities not cited by the parties.  The Court concludes that these Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to establish standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the
ACA under the Commerce Clause, as an unconstitutional tax under Article I §§ 2, 8 & 9 of
the Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment, as a violation of the Tenth Amendment and
7
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as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, i.e., Plaintiffs’ First,
Second, Third and Sixth Claims for Relief.  The three uninsured Plaintiffs in effect allege two
injuries fairly traceable the challenged action of the Defendants 1) the future injury of being
compelled to purchase health care coverage which they have no desire to purchase, see
Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 8, 9 & 18; and 2) a present injury of having to now
investigate how the Act will impact them and alternatives to their current provision for health
care and of altering their finances and saving money for the imminent requirement in th Act
that they purchase health insurance, see Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs’ alleged future injury is concrete and particularized.  That the purchase of
health insurance by Plaintiffs who do not wish (or otherwise plan, see id. at ¶ 9) to purchase
it is a concrete injury is not disputed by Defendants.  The threatened injury is not speculative
or conjectural merely because Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are unlikely to be eligible
for Medicaid or Medicare, that they are unlikely to qualify for any of the Act’s exemptions
from the minimum coverage provision in 2014 or even that they are likely to be subject to
the minimum coverage provision when it goes into effect in 2014.  It may reasonably be
inferred from Plaintiffs’ allegations that they must take steps now in preparation for the
imminent requirement of the Act that they purchase health insurance, id. at ¶ 10, that it is
likely that Plaintiffs will be subject to the minimum coverage.  As to Defendants’ argument
that Plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts showing that it is unlikely that events will occur which
will render Plaintiffs not subject to the Act’s requirement that they purchase health insurance
makes Plaintiffs’ injury speculative, Defendants are asking Plaintiffs to engage in
8
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speculation.  Circumstances are virtually always subject to change.  The Court is of the
opinion that Plaintiffs’ burden of pleading facts sufficient to establish a plausible future
injury does not include eliminating all or even most contingencies that could obviate the
future injury.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at      , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364 (“At the
pleading state, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”)(citation omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S.     , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868, 884 (2009)(a plaintiff’s pleading burden is to
allege sufficient facts to show more than mere possibility of entitlement to relief but less than
the probability of entitlement to relief; the burden is one of showing the plausibility of
entitlement to relief)(citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 557 & 570,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, 940, 941 & 949 (2007)).  In this regard, the Court agrees
with the courts in Florida ex rel. McCollum v United States Department of Health and
Human Services, 716 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1148 (N.D. Fla. 2010) and in Mead v. Holder,     
F.Supp.2d      , 2011 WL 611139 at * 6-7 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011)(No. 10-950(GK)).  In the
McCollum case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, in
response to the defendants’ assertions that the plaintiffs might in the future need or want
health insurance, that businesses and incomes fail and disabilities occur, stated in pertinent
part as follows:
That is possible, of course. It is also “possible” that by 2014 either or both the
plaintiffs will no longer be alive, or may at that time fall within one of the “exempt”
categories. Such “vagaries” of life are always present, in almost every case that
9
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involves a pre-enforcement challenge. If the defendants' position were correct, then
courts would essentially never be able to engage in pre-enforcement review.
Indeed, it is easy to conjure up hypothetical events that could occur to moot a
case or deprive any plaintiff of standing in the future.
. . . . 
. . . . 
In short, to challenge the individual mandate, the individual plaintiffs need not
show that their anticipated injury is absolutely certain to occur despite the
“vagaries” of life; they need merely establish “a realistic danger of sustaining
a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement,” see
Babbitt, supra, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, that is reasonably “pegged to
a sufficiently fixed period of time,” see ACLU, supra 557 F.3d at 1194, and
which is not “merely hypothetical or conjectural,” see NAACP, supra 522 F.3d
at 1161. 
716 F.Supp.2d at 1148.
Allegations of a possible future injury do not suffice to establish the injury in-fact
requirement of standing.  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109
L.Ed.2d 135, 147 (1990); Nova Health Systems v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.
2005).  Rather, “[a] threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to constitute injury in
fact.”  Id., quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99
S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979); Nova Health Systems v. Gandy, 416 F.3d at 1155.  The
threatened injury to the three Plaintiffs herein who do not now have health insurance and do
not wish to purchase it – the requirement that they purchase such insurance or be subject to
penalties – is certainly impending and will not occur at an indefinite time.  Rather, Plaintiffs’
injury will occur in 2014, when the ACA with its incorporated minimum coverage provision
takes effect.  In summary, these three Plaintiffs have shown “a realistic danger of sustaining
10
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a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement,” Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979), and that
the injury is imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.  It is apparent from Plaintiffs’
allegations that there is a causal connection between their alleged injury and the challenged
action of the Defendants such that their injury is fairly traceable to the Defendants and not
the result of some third party’s independent action and that it is likely, not merely
speculative, that the declaratory and/or injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek will redress their
injury.  Defendants do not contend otherwise.  Accordingly, the three uninsured Plaintiffs
have standing by virtue of the alleged threatened future injury to assert their First, Second,
Third and Sixth Claims for Relief.
The three Plaintiffs who do not currently have health insurance have also alleged
sufficient facts to establish standing to assert their First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims for
Relief by virtue of their alleged present injury.  Although those Plaintiffs’ factual allegations
as to the current injury or injuries are not as specific as those in, for example, Mead v.
Holder,      F.Supp.2d     , 2011 WL 611139 at * 8, Plaintiffs’ allegations nonetheless are
sufficient to show the existence of an actual present injury which is sufficiently concrete and
particularized to constitute an injury in fact.  Compare with Mead, supra, and with Florida
v. United States Department of Health and Human Services,       F.Supp.2d      , 2011 WL
285683 at * 7 & 8 (affidavits on summary judgment directed to standing issue).  Again,
Defendants do not argue that there is no causal connection between Plaintiffs’ alleged present
injury, which is alleged to be ongoing, and the conduct of the Defendants, or that it is likely
11
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that those Plaintiffs’ alleged current and ongoing injury will not be redressed by a favorable
decision o the Court granting the requested declaratory and/or injunctive relief and the Court
finds that those aspects of standing are apparent from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint.
B. Remaining Insured Plaintiffs
The remaining Plaintiffs, it may reasonably be inferred from Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, all currently have health insurance.  Yet they allege that “they must
now investigate how the Act will impact them, investigate current provision for health care,
and alter their finances and save money in preparation for the imminent requirement in the
Act” that they purchase health insurance.  Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 10.  These
Plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
Defendants and not the result of some independent action of some third party not before the
Court or of Plaintiffs’ own actions, i.e., a self-directed, unnecessary “injury” not caused by
enactment of the ACA.  Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ argument in their brief
– that Plaintiffs are having to take the alleged actions, as quoted above, because the ACA will
cause the cost of health care insurance to rise due to the prohibition on denying coverage
because of pre-existing medical conditions – as amending Plaintiffs’ allegations, the result
is the same.  First, that insurance costs will increase as a result of the ACA is mere
speculation and speculation about future events does not constitute an injury in fact. 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. at 158, 110 S.Ct. at        , 109 L.Ed.2d at 147.  Nor, in the
Court’s view, can Plaintiffs establish an injury in fact by alleging a current injury based upon
12
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a future event which is merely speculative or possible.  Moreover, Plaintiffs are not
challenging the legality of the ban on denying coverage based on pre-exiting medical
conditions, and Plaintiffs’ injuries must flow from the provision of the ACA they seek to
challenge.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606, 622
n. 6 (1996).  See also Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 
171 L.Ed.2d 737, 748 (2008).  Even if the insured Plaintiffs are suggesting that they will
suffer some future injury if insurance companies were to raise their premiums in response
to the ACA, the ACA does not require insurance companies to raise their premiums, and if
insurance companies did so, any injury to Plaintiffs would be the result of the insurance
companies’ independent actions and not the challenged actions of the Defendants.  See San
Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 926 F.Supp. 1415, 1423 (S.D. Cal. 1995),
aff’d, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996).  In other words Plaintiffs’ future injury would not be
fairly traceable to the ACA or the Defendants.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d at 364.
II.  Standing for Plaintiffs’ Fifth Claim for Relief (Equal Protection)
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any specific provision(s) of the ACA that provide
“earmarks” or “special interest expenditures” for some groups, including unions, and not
Plaintiffs, see Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 33 & 52; have failed to identify any specific
provision(s) of the ACA that exempt some citizens from penalties or “taxes” while imposing
same on others, including the Plaintiffs, based on whether they choose to purchase health
insurance, id. at ¶ 50; see id. at ¶ 29; and have failed to identify any specific provisions of
13
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the ACA that fund and benefit special interest organizations, including unions, “through tax
exemptions and other mechanisms provided for in the Act based on their political views”
while “denying similar funding to other individuals and organizations that do not share
similar viewpoints,” including Plaintiffs, see id. at ¶ 51, ¶¶ 29 & 30.  Indeed, Plaintiffs do not
even allege that such unidentified provisions will not benefit Plaintiffs.  Defendants do allege
that they are not of the same political view as Defendants; that through enforcement of the
Act, certain organizations, specifically unions, will not be “taxed” on their health care plans
because they share Defendants’ political views; and that Plaintiffs will be “taxed for health
care coverage provided by the Act,” and thus that Plaintiffs “will be discriminated against
in the enforcement of the Act.”  Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 29.
Plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific provisions in the ACA which provide the alleged
“earmarks,” “special interest expenditures” and tax exemptions which Plaintiffs maintain
favor some unidentified organizations, including unions and, inferentially, do not benefit
Plaintiffs, is fatal to standing to assert an equal protection claim.  The Court agrees with the
Defendants that “[i]t is impossible to sufficiently allege any injury when a plaintiff cannot
even identify the provision of a statute that purportedly injured him.”  Reply Brief at p. 8. 
And with respect to Plaintiffs’ “claim” for discriminatory enforcement of the ACA by
Defendants, Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 29, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts
showing that their conclusory allegation that Defendants will enforce the Act in a manner
that is discriminatory is anything other than rank speculation.  Hence, any injury to Plaintiffs
from discriminatory enforcement is only a “possible future injury,” Whitmore v. Arkansas,
14
Case 5:10-cv-00353-R   Document 22    Filed 04/26/11   Page 14 of 20
495 U.S. at 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d at 147, or one which is “hypothetical,” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at      , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364, which is insufficient for Article III
standing.  Id.
III.  Standing for Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim
 for Relief (Fourth Amendment – Privacy)
Plaintiffs’ sole allegations to support their Fourth Amendment claim are that “[t]he 
Act requires citizens to provide private medical information to the federal government and/or
its designated agents or authorized health care providers, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment,” Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 60, and that as a result of Defendants’
violation of the Fourth Amendment, “Plaintiffs have suffered immediate and irreparable
harm.”  Id.  Again Plaintiffs have failed to identify what provision of the Act requires the
disclosure of private medical information” to the federal government.  Plaintiffs have also
failed to allege what “private medical information” must be disclosed to the federal
government or even that Plaintiffs will have to disclose it, though the latter may reasonably
be inferred from Plaintiffs’ allegation.  Absent such allegations, Plaintiffs have failed to show
any future or threatened invasion of their Fourth Amendment rights as a result of the ACA
or Defendants’ conduct which is concrete and particularized and not conjectural or
hypothetical.  Moreover, although Plaintiffs allege that the Act requires citizens to provide
private medical information to the federal government’s designated agents or authorized
health care providers, id ¶ 60, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any provision of the ACA
which authorizes private health care providers to act for the federal government as its agents
15
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or otherwise, and absent such an allegation, any injury to Plaintiffs occasioned by having to
provide private medical information to health care providers is not fairly traceable to the
ACA or the actions of the Defendants and not the result of independent actions of third
parties not before the Court, nor is it likely that the declaratory and/or injunctive relief sought
would redress the alleged injury.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d at
364.
Plaintiffs suggest in their brief in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss that the
Act will require Plaintiffs to divulge to the federal government whether or not they have
health insurance and what kind, in which information they contend they have a protected
privacy right.  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion at p. 5.  Even if the Court were
to treat Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as amended by this “allegation,” Plaintiffs
have failed to identify any provision of the ACA which requires the disclosure of this
information, so any injury to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights, based upon
Plaintiffs’ pleadings, is conjectural or hypothetical and is not fairly traceable to the ACA or
the Defendants’ enforcement of it.
IV.  Standing for Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief
(Free Exercise Clause)
Plaintiffs allege that the ACA forces Plaintiffs to contribute to the funding of abortion,
see Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 19-22 & 45, in violation of Plaintiffs’ “fundamental
rights of conscience and the free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment to
the Constitution,” id. at ¶ 45, as a result of which “Plaintiffs have suffered immediately harm,
16
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including the loss of their constitutional rights.”  Id.  Again, Plaintiffs have failed to identify
a provision of the ACA that requires them to contribute to the funding of abortion, much less
identified a provision of the ACA that requires them to purchase health insurance from an
insurer that provides insurance coverage for abortions and/or that any part of the premiums
the Plaintiffs will pay for health care insurance will necessarily be used, at least in part, to
pay for abortions.  Absent such allegations, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a future or
threatened injury that is concrete and not conjectural or hypothetical or one which is fairly
traceable to the ACA or the actions of the Defendants.
Moreover, as Defendants point out, the ACA requires that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services “shall assure” that there is at least one qualified health care plan offered in
an Exchange that does not provide coverage for abortions for which federal funding is either
prohibited or allowed.  See ACA § 1393(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) & (D)(ii)(I); see also ACA §
1334(a)(6) (there mut be at least one multi-state plan offered in an Exchange that does not
provide coverage for abortions for which federal funding is prohibited).  Moreover, even if
Plaintiffs decided to purchase insurance in an Exchange from a plan that covers abortion
services for which federal funding is prohibited (non-excepted abortion services), payments
by enrollees for coverage of non-excepted services must be separated from payments by
enrollees for coverage of other services, and payments for the latter may not be used to pay
for non-excepted abortion services.  ACA § 1303(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II).  Plaintiffs have not
responded to this argument Defendants make in support of their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Fourth Claim, based upon the Free Exercise Clause, for lack of standing.  Therefore, pursuant
17
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to LCvR 7.1(g), in the Court’s discretion, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is deemed
confessed and is granted.  LCvR 7.1(g).  See United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1251
(10th Cir. 2009)(“[A] respondent must address any and all issues raised by a moving party’s
papers, or else face the very real possibility that it will be deemed to have abandoned its right
to do so.”).
V.  Ripeness
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent courts from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements by premature adjudication.  See National Park
Hospitality Association v. Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807, 123 S.Ct. 2-026, 2029,
155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003).  The ripeness inquiry asks not whether the plaintiff has in fact been
harmed, but “whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial
intervention.”  Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 890 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting Warth
v.Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343,         n. 10 (1975).  To
determine whether issues presented by a case are ripe for review, a court must “evaluate both
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.”  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18
L.Ed.2d 681,       (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105,
97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).  Whether a case is fit for judicial resolution depends on
“whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.”  Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d at 890, quoting
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10thCir. 1995)(internal
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quotation marks omitted).  The hardship inquiry is answered by asking “whether the
challenged action creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the parties.”  Id. at 891, quoting
New Mexicans, 64 F.3d at 1499 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The issues presented by the three uninsured Plaintiffs in their First, Second, Third and
Sixth Claims for relief are ripe for adjudication.  “Where the inevitability of the operation of
a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into
effect.”  Blanchette v.Connecticut General Insurance Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S.Ct. 335,
42 L.Ed.2d 320, 353 (1974).  Moreover, the inevitable operation of the ACA is, according to
the uninsured Plaintiffs’ allegations, having “a direct effect on [their] day-to-day business”
now.  Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152, 87 S.Ct. at      , 18 L.Ed.2d at 693.  Hence, both
the fitness and hardship inquiries are answered in the affirmative for the uninsured Plaintiffs’
First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims for Relief.
As should be evident from the Court’s discussion concerning the remaining, currently
insured Plaintiffs’ standing to assert the same claims, those Plaintiffs’ claims involve
uncertain or contingent future events that may never occur and neither the ACA nor
Defendants’ enforcement of it creates any direct and immediate dilemma for those Plaintiffs. 
Thus, for the Plaintiffs who currently have health care insurance, both prongs of the ripeness
inquiry are answered in the negative.
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Having concluded that all Plaintiffs herein have failed to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate standing to assert their Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Claims for Relief, the Court
finds it unnecessary to address whether such claims are ripe.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their Amended
Complaint [Doc. No. 19] is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended
Complaint [Doc. No. 19-1] is deemed filed instanter; Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc.
No. 12], treated as directed to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth and Seventh
Claims for Relief being GRANTED and those claims DISMISSED for lack of standing;
Defendants’ motion to dismiss all insured Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims
for Relief being GRANTED and all of those Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims
for Relief DISMISSED for lack of standing and ripeness; and Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the First, Second, Third and Sixth Claims for Relief of the three uninsured Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs Martye McCall, David Lowther and James Walters, being DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of April, 2011.
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